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A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial 
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct 
at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the 
Weakness of the Opponent's Case 
Edward J. Imwinkelried* 
The pliiintiffs counsel continues her closing argument: 
"Ladies and gentlemen, for the past half hour we've listened to 
opposing counsel's attempt to  defend his client's actions in this 
case. I'd like to talk for a few moments about the defense 
counsel's own actions in this case. Think back to  evidence 
which we presented about opposing counsel's destruction of 
those accounts payable records. Ask yourself: WHY did he 
stoop to doing that? WHY would. he do something so 
underhanded? Common sense tells you the answer. Counsel 
permitted those invoices to  be shredded because he knew that 
those records would have shown that his client, the defendant, 
recognized a debt to my client, Ms. Grant. The likelihood is 
that those records would have shown in black and white that 
there was a contract. Counsel destroyed those records for one 
reason and one reason alone-because they would have proved 
that the defendant had a contract with Ms. Grant. Those 
records would have shown that the defendant owes her the 
money she's suing today to collect." 
From the perspective of an individual litigant, a closing 
argument of this tenor could be potent trial'advocacy.' In the 
minds of many jurors, a trial is the modern equivalent of a 
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former chair, Evidence 
Section, American Association of Law Schools; B.A. 1967, J.D. 1969, University of 
San Francisco. 
1. In the famous English trial of Robert Wood, the prosecutor "stressed the 
fad that Wood had attempted to suborn a number of possible witnesses, and in 
many ways had tried to tamper with potential evidence, and stop evidence 
reaching the police through normal channels." The "Crown relied on this attempt 
to suborn witnesses and concoct a false alibi as a clear indication of guilt on 
Wood's part." Basil Hogarth, Robert Wood 1907, in FAMOUS TRIALS 170, 194-95 
(Harry Hodge & James H. Hodge eds., 1986). 
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morality play, and the advocate must convince the jury that 
"fundamental justice" is on her client's side.2 Jurors view the 
trial as a "moral arena,"3 and they endeavor to decide whether 
the plaintiff or defendant is on the side of the angels. It is true 
that the above hypothetical argument focuses on the opposing 
attorney's misdeed rather than on his client's personal 
misconduct. However, the attorney is the client's representative 
in the litigation; and jurors often assess the client, in part, by 
the conduct of the attorney representing her.' 
Permitting this type of argument may also be desirable 
from the perspective of the litigation system. The very 
possibility of this type of argument could deter counsel from 
engaging in pretrial discovery misconduct. The general 
consensus is that misconduct is widespread during dis~overy.~ 
Many commentators are of the opinion that deliberate 
obstructionism is ~ommonplace.~ In a survey of litigators 
conducted by the American Bar Foundation, most respondents 
indicated that it is a common occurrence for attorneys drafting 
interrogatory answers to wrongfully withhold relevant, 
unprivileged information.' Similar misconduct is a regular 
occurrence during document produ~tion.~ 
Another consensus is now emerging: the defensive strat- 
egies designed to  curb discovery misconduct have largely failed. 
As Judge Myron Bright, senior judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has observed, it does 
little good to  merely order a litigant to do what he should have 
2. James W. McElhaney, Goals in Opening Statement, LITIGATION, Winter 
1990, at  47, 48; see also James W. McElhaney, The Sense of Injustice, LITIGATION, 
Spring 1988, a t  47. 
3. James W. McElhaney, Qualities of Winners, LITIGATION, Fall 1992, a t  51, 
52. 
4. Michael E. Tigar, Jury Argument: You, the Facts, and the Law, 
LITIGATION, Summer 1988, at  19, 20. 
5. EDWARD IMWINRELRIED & THEODORE BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS 8 1 : O l  (1986). 
6. Robert Howard & Kathleen M. Crowley, Pleading, Discovery, and Pretrial 
Procedure for Litigation Against Government Spying, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 931, 
978 (1978); William H. ReMine 111 & James L. Gilbert, Discovery: Abuses, 
Sanctions, and Ethical Concerns, TRIAL, Jan. 1987, a t  56; Jerold S. Solovy & 
Robert L. Byman, Hardball Discovery, LITIGATION, Fall 1988, at  10; Richard L. 
Whitworth & James L. Gilbert, Punishing Evidence Destruction: Keeping Discovery 
Fair and Open, TRIAL, Nov. 1992, at  66 (calling discovery abuse "widespread"). 
7. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effmtiveness, Its 
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 789, 829. 
8. I ~ K E L R I E D  & BLUMOFF, supra note 5, 5 8:27. 
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done four months bef~re .~  It is true that many bar 
organizations have issued new rules of legal ethics,1° but the 
issuance of those rules has not stemmed the tide of discovery 
misconduct. In many, if not most, jurisdictions, the bar 
disciplinary system is slow and ineffective." 
Partly in response to the perceived failure of the bar 
disciplinary system, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16, 
and 26 were amended in 1983. The thrust of the amendments 
was to  toughen the enforcement of discovery obligations.12 In 
particular, the amendments were intended to  encourage judges 
to punish discovery misconduct by imposing sanctions more 
aggres~ively.'~ It was hoped that the sanctions "movement" 
would discourage obstructionism.14 Although the movement 
was promising, it now appears doubtful that sanctions alone 
will provide an adequate solution to the problem of discovery 
misc~nduct.'~ To obtain sanctions, the victim of discovery 
abuse must resort to court which may result in distracting 
satellite litigation.16 Litigating a sanctions motion can be time 
consuming, and becoming embroiled in sanctions litigation is 
particularly dangerous in jurisdictions with "fast track" 
calendars. Fast track calendars were implemented in many 
jurisdictions to reduce delays in litigation." In these 
9. Judge Bright made the remark a t  the National Practice Institute Seminar 
in San Diego, California on January 22, 1993. The author participated in the same 
seminar. 
10. In  August 1983, the American Bar Association House of Delegates 
approved the new Rules of Professional Conduct, replacing the old Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
11. David 0. Weber, "Still in Good Standing:" The Crisis in Attorney 
Discipline, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, a t  58; Lawyer Complaints Rise, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 
26, 1993, a t  6 ("Complaints against attorneys in Ohio can take years to review, 
and very few of those complaints result in disciplinary adion . . . ."); Monitor 
Takes Another Slap at Bar Discipline, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1987, at  14. But cf. Timothy 
K. McPike & Mark I. Harrison, The True Story on Lawyer Discipline, A.B.A. J., 
Sept. 1984, at  92, 93 (claiming improvement of the bar disciplinary system). 
12. See Joan M. Hall, New Amendments Are Far  Reaching, 69 A.B.A. J. 1640 
(1983). 
13. SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985). 
14. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF L~TIGATION ABUSE 
5 2 (1989). 
15. Id. 5 3A(A) (Supp. 1992). 
16. IMWINKEWED & BLUMOFF, supra note 5, 9 13:14 (Supp. 1992); Sanctions: 
Rule 11 and Other Powers, 1986 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 11-12. 
17. Rodney H. Glover, Crisis in the Courts? The Rockt Docket, ~ ~ m , ' A p r .  
1993, a t  45; Williams K. Wells, Jr., Expedited Cases: Effiiency Is Crucial to 
Success, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1993, a t  31. See generally CAL. GOVT CODE $$ 68600- 
68620 (the Trial Delay Reduction Act). 
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jurisdictions, a litigant may have only a fraction of the time 
that she previously had between fling a complaint and trial-a 
period of months rather than years. Under a fast track 
procedure, a litigant can ill afford to invest weeks or months of 
precious pretrial time in pressing a sanctions motion. 
There is a growing sense among ethical litigators that they 
need to go on the offensive against discovery misconduct. More 
specifically, they believe that they need self-help techniques 
which they can use as offensive weapons against obstructionist 
opponents. Treating the opponent's pretrial obstructionism as 
an "admission by conduct"-illustrated by the hypothetical 
closing argument quoted earlier-is one potential technique. 
While the litigator contemplating such an argument might be 
required to seek judicial approval of the argument,18 this 
could be done both quickly and informally at the conference 
typically held between the close of the evidence and the 
delivery of jury  instruction^.'^ This procedure for obtaining 
judicial approval would be much more streamlined than that of 
filing and litigating a sanctions motion. Moreover, to  use Judge 
Bright's expression, the technique of "admission by conduct" 
does far more than merely order the opponent to  do what he or 
she should have done four months before; it could make the 
opponent pay a real price for discovery misconduct if the 
misconduct incenses the jury and the jury expresses its anger 
in the verdict.20 
In criminal cases, the courts frequently admit testimony 
about an accused's pretrial misconduct on the theory that the 
misconduct evidences the accused's consciousness of guilt. For 
instance, if the accused threatens the prosecution's witnesses or 
conceals incriminating physical evidence, the prosecution may 
use this to help prove the accused's ~ulpability.~~ The 
18. Many jurisdictions require the attorney to obtain the judge's approval 
before making a "missing witness" argument during summation. United States v. 
Pitts, 918 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
19. RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, YNAMICS OF TRIAL 
PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 8 13.1 (1989). 
20. A civil jury's perception of the litigant may affect the damages award. 
According to one study, if a civil jury learns that the defendant has a criminal 
record, the plaintiff can expect to recov'er a verdict % higher than normal. If the 
civil jury learns that the plaintiff has a record, the plaintiff is likely to recover a 
verdict 16% below the national average for similar cases. DAVID L. HERBERT & 
ROGER K. B A R R ~ ,  ATTORNEY'S MASTER GUIDE TO COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY: HOW 
TO APPLY BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TECHNIQUES FOR NEW TRIAL SUCCESS 320-21 
(1980). 
21. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 8 3:04 
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accused's behavior sometimes takes the form of discovery 
misconduct such as refusing to submit to a scientific testing 
procedure.zz So long as the conduct is the sort of behavior a , 
guilty person might resort to in order to prevent a conviction, 
there is a permissive inference of consciousness of &t. The 
prosecution may both introduce testimony about the behavior 
and treat the behavior as an admission by conductZ3 during 
closing argument. By doing so, the prosecutor invites the jury 
to infer the accused's guilt from the accused's conduct. In effect, 
by acting in this manner, the accused "admits" his The 
criminal courts have even extended this doctrine to situations 
in which the pretrial misconduct was that of the defense 
counsel rather than the accused.25 
(1984). California Evidence Code section 413 explicitly states, "In determining what 
inferences to draw from the evidence or fads in the case against a party, the trier 
of fact may consider, among other things, the party's . . . willful suppression of 
evidence relating thereto . . . . "). See Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 787 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (Ct. App. 1992); 
cf. P.R. R. EVID. 16.5 (similar to CAL. EVID. CODE $ 413). 
22. United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1989) (refusal to provide 
handwriting sample); Spicer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 562 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (refusal 
to submit to a breathalyzer test); People v. McPeters, 832 P.2d 146 (Cal. 1992) 
(refusal to cooperate during a psychiatric examination), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
1865 (1993); People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1992) (refusal to take blood 
test), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 436 (1992); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 549 A.2d 231 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (refusal to submit to a neutron activation analysis test), 
' appeal denied, 559 A.2d 36 (1989). 
23. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE $8 263-65 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter MCCORMICK]. In truth, testimony about this type of conduct does not 
fall within the technical definition of hearsay. Under Federal Rule 801(a), evidence 
amounts to hearsay only if it constitutes an assertive statement or act. The 
declarant must intend the statement or act to communicate factual information. 
Thus, it would be hearsay for a declarant to say, "My position in this litigation is 
weak," or to nod approval when asked, "Is your position in this litigation weak?" 
The declarant does not subjectively intend to communicate information when she 
attempts to bribe a witness or suppress a relevant document. 
However, there is early common law authority treating nonverbal conduct 
implying a statement as a hearsay statement. Id. 8 250. The terminology 
"admission by conduct" originated under common law. In light of that authority, 
the condud could be considered hearsay; to justifj. introducing evidence of the 
conduct, it was necessary to hring the evidence within a recognized hearsay 
exception or exemption such as the doctrine permitting the admission of testimony 
about a party-opponent's admissions. The contraction of the definition of hearsay 
eliminates the need to invoke an exception or exemption, but the terminology 
persists. 
24. Id. 
25. John H. Mansfield, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 695, 727 n.90 (1992) (citing United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 
927 (7th Cir. 1990), a case in which the defense counsel suggested to a witness 
that the witness had seen a third party, not the accused, at the crime scene). 
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In contrast, in civil cases, the courts have been more 
reluctant to  invoke the admission by conduct doctrine against 
litigants. On the one hand, they have applied the doctrine 
when the litigant herself has committed criminal or tortious 
acts obstructing pretrial discovery. Thus, the courts will admit 
evidence of a litigant's personal spoliation of eviden~e'~ such 
as a civil defendant's destruction of relevant documents or 
physical evidence. However, the courts generally have balked 
at admitting evidence of lawful conduct by the litigant and her 
attorney. At a series of continuing legal education seminars 
sponsored by the National Practice Institute in 1992-93,'' 
some attorneys and judges in attendance remarked that it 
would be "unheard of" to  admit an attorney's pretrial discovery 
misconduct against the attorney's client at trial on this theory. 
In late 1992, Professor John Mansfield of the Harvard Law 
School published a provocative article entitled Evidential Use of 
Litigation Activity of the Parties." As a general rule, a 
statement in an affidavit by a client, submitted in support of a 
pretrial motion, may come back to haunt the client as a 
personal admission at the subsequent trial?' Similarly, as 
Professor Mansfield notes, a remark by the client's attorney 
during the opening statement in one trial might be offered as a 
vicarious admission against the same client in a later trial.30 
Mansfield observes that the pretrial and trial activity of both 
litigants and their attorneys can generate evidence against the 
litigants. He takes the position that such evidence should be 
admissible against the client unless there is a substantial 
likelihood that evidential use of the activity will deter an 
26. 2 SPENCER A. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 13:46, at  517 11.61 (6th ed. 
1972); Brian E. Howard, Spoliation of Evidence, 49 J. MO. B. 121 (1993); see also 
Sullivan v. General Motors Corp., 772 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Ohio 1991); John 
M. Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied horn Spoliation or Related 
Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226 (1935). In Meyer v. McDo~el l ,  392 A.2d 1129 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1978), the court held that a medical malpractice defendant's attempt 
to "tamper" with the plaintif'f's expert witnesses was admissible as evidence of the 
defendant physician's consciousness of the weakness of his case. 
27. The seminars were conducted in San Diego, California (January 22, 1993), 
Los Angeles, California (January 23, 1993), and Minneapolis, Minnesota (March 21, 
1993). The author participated in each of these seminars where he raised the 
possibility of treating the opposition's pretrial discovery misconduct as an admission 
a t  trial. 
28. Mansfield, supra note 25, a t  695. 
29. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2XA); see also United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 
30-33 (2d Cir. 1984). 
30. Mansfield, supra note 25, a t  716-22. 
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activity which furthers an important objective of the litigation 
process?' He argues, however, that there is such a significant 
interest in "uninhibited [pretrial discovery] investigative 
activity" that as a evidence of that activity 
should be inad~nissible.~~ 
This article explores the extent to which Professor 
Mansfield's generalization should apply to  the discovery 
misconduct of litigants and their attorneys. The thesis of this 
article is that discovery misconduct should be excepted from 
the generalization. The first section of this article addresses the 
question of whether a civil litigant's personal discovery 
misconduct should be admissible against the litigant client at 
trial as an "admission by conduct" of the weakness of the 
client's position. The section concludes that the evidence should 
be admissible even when the conduct is neither criminal nor 
tortious. The conduct should be treated as an admission by 
conduct so long as the conduct supports a rational, permissive 
inference that the client believes his or her position in the 
litigation to be weak. The second section of this article turns to  
the related question of whether the discovery misconduct of the 
litigant's attorney should be admissible against the litigant 
even when the litigant has neither authorized nor ratified the 
conduct. This section argues that the attornefs conduct is 
relevant and ought to be admissible for this purpose. However, 
the section also concedes that as a practical matter, the courts 
in some jurisdictions will probably exclude testimony about 
such conduct whenever its admission would run afoul of the 
advocate-witness prohibition-the rule of legal ethics generally 
prohibiting attorneys from testifying at trials at which they 
serve as advocates. In most jurisdictions, the routine 
recognition of a litigant's right to  prove the opposing attorney's 
pretrial discovery misconduct will likely have to  await the 
reform of the advocate-witness rule. 
31. Id. at 701-02. 
32. Id. at 727. 
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A. The Probative Value of Evidence of the 
Client's Personal Misconduct 
Suppose that before trial, the opposing client personally 
commits an act of spoliation of evidence.33 Although he realiz- 
es that a particular document is relevant to a pending lawsuit, 
he is also aware that its contents would undermine his position 
in the lawsuit. He consequently destroys the document. By 
doing so, in many jurisdictions, he commits an independent 
tort." In some jurisdictions with broadly worded obstruction 
of justice statutes, he also may have perpetrated a crime.35 Al- 
though evidence of such misconduct will be embarrassing to the 
client, at the subsequent trial in the same lawsuit many courts 
would admit the evidence on the theory that his acts amounted 
to  an admission by conduct." The fact that the client resorted 
to  this tactic is probative circumstantial evidence that he be- 
lieves that his position in the litigation is weak. To be sure, 
there are other possible explanations for the client's conduct. 
For instance, the client may have resorted to this tactic simply 
as "additional insurance" of victory. However, there is at least a 
permissive inference that the client's motivation was a belief 
that he would lose on the merits if the opposition discovered 
the document in question. In turn, the client's consciousness of 
the weakness of his position is some evidence that the position 
is indeed weak. Admittedly, it is possible that the client is 
mistaken about the invalidity of his position in the litigation; 
the client might be laboring under a misapprehension about 
the governing substantive law. However, compared to the judge 
and jurors, the client is in a particularly good position to  know 
the merit of his position. His belief that his position lacks merit 
is probative of the.position's weakness. 
33. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 
1992); Destruction or Loss of Evidence: Marroca, v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 
220 (CA7 1992), 36 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 511 (1992). 
34. Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, Inter- 
fering with Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 70 A.L.R.4th 984 (1989). 
35. Jane M. Graf'feo, Note, Ethics, Law, and Loyalty: The Attorney's Duty to 
Tun Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L. REV. 977, 987-92 (1980). 
36. Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993); GARD, supra 
note 26, 8 13:46, at 517; MCCORMICK, supm note 23, §§ 264-65; Maguire & Vin- 
cent, supra note 26. 
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The question that arises, though, is whether this theory of 
admissibility applies only when the act committed by the client 
constitutes an independent tort or crime. Suppose, for example, 
that although the act violated the client's discovery obligations, 
the act amounted to neither a criminal offense nor a tort. Could 
evidence of the act nevertheless be admitted on a consciousness 
of liability theory? As previously stated, in the past the courts 
have been reluctant t o  extend the doctrine this far.37 One 
leading treatise indicates that the theory is limited to fact 
situations in which the client "resort[s] to  wrongful devices."38 
That limitation is unsound. In the cases in which courts 
have admitted testimony about criminal or tortious acts evi- 
dencing consciousness of liability or guilt, they have not done 
so because the acts constituted crimes or torts.3g Rather, they 
have admitted the evidence despite the fact that the act coinci- 
dentally amounted to a crime or tort!' The jury's realization 
that the client committed a crime or tort might well prejudice 
the jurors against the client. The risk of such prejudice is a 
potential reason for excluding otherwise admissible evi- 
dence." Under the legal relevance doctrine, codified in Feder- 
al Rule of Evidence 403 governing in federal practice (35 states 
have adopted evidence codes patterned after the Federal 
~ules)," a judge may exclude otherwise admissible, relevant 
evidence when she fears that the introduction of the evidence 
would generate "unfair prejudice" against the litigant."3 Even 
if the jurors were not convinced of the client's liability, they 
might be tempted to return a verdict adverse to the client as a 
means of punishing the client for his misdeed. 
In spite of Rule 403, the courts routinely admit conscious- 
ness-of-liability or &t evidence for the simple reason that it is 
37. GARD, supra note 26, (5 13:46, discusses the theory, but almost all the 
cases cited involve ads  which are tortious or criminal. 
38. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, Q 265, at  465. 
39. IMWINKELRIED, supm note 21, Q 2:16, at  43; 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMI- 
NAL EVIDENCE Q 233 (12th ed. 1955). 
40. United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 582 
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (5 305 (rev. ed. 1979). 
41. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
5 140 (rev. ed. 1985). 
42. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 26-27 (3d ed. 
1991) (listing 34 states). In addition, Kentucky recently adopted a code modeled 
after the Federal Rules. Similar evidence codes will soon go into effect in a num- 
ber of other jurisdictions, including Indiana. 
43. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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highly relevant to show the client's belief that her case is weak. 
It is not the act's character as a crime or tort which supplies its 
logical relevance.44 Even if the act were perfectly lawful, the 
facts would remain: after realizing that the document was 
relevant in a pending lawsuit, the client suppressed the docu- 
ment. Standing alone, those facts support a rational inference 
that the document's contents would have damaged the client's 
position in the litigation. 
It is true that in many jurisdictions, spoliation of evidence 
now constitutes a tort.45 However, the recognition of spoliation 
as an independent tort is a recent, twentieth century phenome- 
n ~ n . ' ~  The cases admitting evidence of spoliation as proof of 
consciousness of liability antedate the treatment of spoliation 
as a tort. As early as the seventeenth century, English courts 
permitted the opponent to invite the jury to  draw an adverse 
inference from a client's spoliation of relevant eviden~e.~' The 
application of the consciousness-of-liability theory to  spoliation 
evidence has an ancient lineage, even though spoliation is a 
relative newcomer in tort law. In short, literally for centuries 
the courts permitted juries to draw an inference of conscious- 
ness of liability from acts of spoliation although the spoliation 
did not amount to a tort. 
The law of privileges also points to the conclusion that the 
client's discovery misconduct should be admissible even when 
the misconduct falls short of a crime or tort. In many jurisdic- 
tions, when a litigant claims a common-law or statutory privi- 
lege at  trial, during closing argument the opposition may urge 
the jury to infer that the suppressed testimony would have 
been unfavorable to the litigant invoking the privilege.48 In 
these cases, the litigant's conduct is entirely lawful. As holder 
of the privilege, the litigant has a right to bar the testimony. 
That right is the essence of the privilege. Yet these jurisdic- 
44. IMWINKELRIED, supm note 21, § 2:16; 1 WHARTON, supra note 39, § 233. 
45. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 
1992). 
46. See generally JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
(1989) (analyzing the history and development of the law concerning destruction of 
evidence). See also RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS 
§ 5.11.2, at 216 (1988) (calling spoliation of evidence "a new tort"); Note, Should 
Iowa Adopt the Tort of Intentional Spoliation of Evidence in Civil Litigation?, 41 
DRAKE L. REV. 179 (1982). 
47. Howard, supra note 26, at  130 n.20; see also Sam LaManna, Courts Take 
a Harder Line on Spoliation, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1993, at  17. 
48. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, 8 74.1. 
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tions allow the opposition to present the argument in summa- 
tion because there is nevertheless a permissive inference that 
the excluded testimony would have shown the weakness of the 
litigant's position. "No showing of wrong or fraud seems to be 
required. . . for the inference that the evidence if produced 
would have been unfav~rable."~~ In context, the assertion of 
the privilege gives rise to that rational inference, and that 
inference validates the closing argument. Analogously, whenev- 
er a client's a d  of discovery misconduct gives rise to  the requi- 
site inference, the act is relevant as evidence of the client's 
consciousness of the weakness of his position in the litigation. 
B. Counterarguments to the Admissibility of the 
Client's Discovery Misconduct 
The logical relevance of an item of evidence does not guar- 
antee its admission at trial. In numerous cases, the courts 
exclude relevant evidence. In some cases, they do so under 
statutes such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on the ground 
that incidental probative dangers substantially outweigh the 
probative value of the evidence, as mentioned earlier. In other 
cases, they do so to promote an extrinsic social policy. The 
attorney-client privilege is a case in point. Upholding that priv- 
ilege can result in the exclusion of relevant, demonstrably reli- 
able evidence. However, the courts sustain these privilege 
claims on the ground that the existence of the privilege pro- 
motes candor between client and attorney and thereby contrib- 
utes to the effective functioning of the legal system.50 Both 
grounds for exclusion can be invoked to  attack the admissibility 
of evidence of the client's discovery misconduct, offered on a 
consciousness-of-liability theory. 
1. The probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the 
probative danger that the introduction of the evidence and re- 
buttal testimony will focus the jury's attention on a collateral 
issue and distract the jury from the historical merits of the case 
The principal task facing the trier of fact is to  decide the 
historical merits of the case. To do so, the trier must usually 
resolve questions about a central historical event such as a 
49. Id. 8 74.1, at 104. 
50. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privi- 
lege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J .  LEGAL STUD. 359 (1990). 
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traffic accident or commercial transaction. To the extent that 
the trial judge admits evidence about other "collateral" occur- 
rences-events other than the main events on the merits of the 
case-there is a risk that the jurors will lose sight of the main 
events on which they should focus. For example, under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403, the judge may exclude relevant evidence 
when she concludes that the evidence poses a substantial dan- 
ger of "confusion of the issues . . . or misleading the 
A party resisting the admission of evidence of his discovery 
misconduct might cite Rule 403 as support for the argument 
that the evidence will distract the jury from the merits of the 
case. The argument is plausible. For example, the question is 
not whether the defendant physically blocked access to  a plant 
which the plaintiff's expert was scheduled to  inspect; the ques- 
tion is whether the plant is an unreasonably dangerous work 
site. Likewise, the question is not whether the defendant con- 
cealed an accounts payable log page reflecting a debt to the 
plaintiff; the question is whether the defendant received a 
shipment of merchandise from the plaintiff. 
However, it would be a mistake to  think that as a matter 
of course, trial judges exercise their discretion under Rule 403 
to exclude any item of evidence relating to an event other than 
the central historical event on the merits of the case. Quite the 
contrary is true. For example, in tort product liability actions, 
plaintiffs frequently introduce evidence of other accidents in- 
volving the same or a similarly designed produ~t.~' Evidence 
of other accidents involving other victims is admissible t o  es- 
tablish the existence of the defect in the product's design.53 
"Indeed, from a jury's point of view, there may be no more 
important evidence on the issue of the product's defective con- 
dition than the performance and experience of that product in 
the real It would certainly be inaccurate to claim 
that judges never exercise discretion to  exclude evidence of 
collateral ac~idents;~ but the courts seem receptive to  testi- 
51. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
52. Mary A. Parker & Susan Garner, Special Evidentiary Issues in Products 
Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 41, 42 ("[Ulnder the case law and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, evidence of similar accidents is normally admitted."); see also Francis H. 
Hare, Jr. & Mitchell K. Shelly, The, Admissibility of Other Similar Incident Eui- 
dence: A Three-Step Approach, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 541 (1992). 
53. IMWINREWED, supm note 21, 8 7:21. 
54. Gary C. Robb, Admissibility of Prior Accidents Can Be a Rky Euidentiary 
Issue, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1989, at 18. 
55. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Euidence: Getting It Out 
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mony about collateral events so long as the events have signifi- 
cant probative worth on the historical merits of the case.56 
Like evidence of another accident proffered in a product 
liability case, testimony about discovery misconduct can be 
highly relevant circumstantial proof. When an identically de- 
signed product malfunctions and the defendant manufacturer 
cannot offer a credible, alternative explanation for the cause of 
the accident, there is a powerful inference that the product has 
a design defect. Similarly, when a client singles out and de- 
stroys only the records relating to the commercial transaction 
on which the plaintiff is suing, there is a strong inference that 
the records would have demonstrated the defendant's liability. 
On its face, Rule 403 permits the judge to balance the proba- 
tive value of the item of evidence against the attendant proba- 
tive dangers. Although in both cases (the other accident and 
the discovery misdeed) the evidence relates to  "collateral" 
events, it is equally true that both items of evidence can have 
considerable probative worth. When they possess substantial 
probative value, both types of evidence can survive scrutiny 
under Rule 403. 
Even in an extreme case when the evidence of the client's 
discovery misconduct has only marginal probative value, the 
trial judge can usually reduce the danger of jury distraction to 
acceptable proportions without altogether excluding the evi- 
dence. The trial judge's ruling need not be an "all or nothing" 
prop~sition.~' Under Rule 403, it is quite common for the 
judge t o  admit some of the proffered evidence but exclude the 
balance.58 If the client were guilty of several incidents of dis- 
covery misconduct, the judge could reduce the risk of distrac- 
tion by limiting the number of incidents provable at trial.59 Or 
suppose that the plaintiff proposes calling four witnesses to 
testify to the defendant's act of discovery misconduct. The judge 
into the Light, TRLAL, Nov. 1984, at 58. 
56. Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, SA., 979 F.2d 1434, 1440 
(10th Cir. 1992) ("In such actions, courts routinely permit the introduction of sub- 
stantially similar ads . . . ."); Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 
1070, 1082-83 (5th Cir.. 1986); James B. Sales, Admissibility of Evidence of Other 
Similar Accidents or Complaints and Evulence of Subsequent Remedial Measures, 
1984 S.M.U. PRODUCTS L I A B I ~  INSTITUTE 9 6.01[3] ('!The requisite degree of 
similarity is plainly not very high.") (quoting Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 
1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
57. IMWINKEWED, supm note 21, 9 8:32, at 61. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
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could minimize the risk of distraction by restricting the plain- 
tiff to two witne~ses.~' In short, even though pretrial acts of 
discovery misconduct are technically collateral to the main 
events in issue, the probative danger of distraction does not 
justify a general rule excluding the client's pretrial discovery 
misconduct. 
2. The evidence should be excluded on the policy ground that 
the admission of such evidence will pressure the client's attor- 
ney to testify in violation of the advocate-w itness prohibition 
As Professor Mansfield notes, the advocate-witness prohibi- 
tion can conceivably block the evidential use of a party's litiga- 
tion a~tivity.~'  Under the American Bar Association's former 
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer generally could 
not testify in a case in which she was acting as trial attor- 
ney:' the lawyer would be personally disqualified from trying 
the case. Moreover, the Code vicariously disqualified any other 
member of the lawyer's firm from trying the case.63 Under the 
ABA's current Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer- 
witness is still personally disqualified; but the vicarious dis- 
qualification of other firm members is no longer in effect.64 It  
is true that, on their face, these provisions are rules of legal 
ethics; however, many courts have enforced the rules by exclud- 
ing proposed testimony by lawyers that would run afoul of the 
ethical  proscription^.^^ 
Notwithstanding these proscriptions, the courts ordinarily 
should admit evidence about a client's personal discovery mis- 
conduct. Even assuming arguendo that the courts ought to 
exclude testimony violative of the advocate-witness prohibition, 
in many, if not most, cases in which a party offers such evi- 
dence, neither the proponent party nor the opponent will have 
to resort to testimony that would violate these proscriptions. 
In the typical case, the proponent will not have to present 
her own attorney's testimony to establish the opposing client's 
discovery misconduct. Suppose, for example, that the miscon- 
60. See United States v. Benefield, 889 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1989) (restriding 
the number of charader witnesses); CARLSON W AL., supra note 42, at 320. 
61. Mansfield, supra note 25, at 704-06. 
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1969). 
63. Id. 
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983). 
65. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED W AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 5 214 
(1987). 
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duct takes the form of a misleading affidavit or declaration 
submitted in connection with a pretrial discovery motion. The 
proponent will not have to proffer her attorney's testimony t o  
authenticate the affidavit or declaration; the document will be 
on file with the court, and the judge may judicially notice the 
contents of the court files.66 Judicial notice dispenses with the 
necessity for live testimony. Further, assume that the miscon- 
dud occurs at a deposition hearing. The court reporter's official 
transcript of the hearing will document the misconduct. The 
transcript can be admitted based on the reporter's testimony or 
an attached, self-authenticating attesting certificate executed 
by the rep~rter.~' Or suppose that the opposing client person- 
ally interfered with an expert's scheduled examination of either 
the client's personal condition or property in the client's custo- 
dy. Since the expert herself could testify to the client's acts, 
there would be no need to call the proponent's attorney. Indeed, 
the proponent's attorney might not have even witnessed the 
opposing client's acts; attorneys frequently do not attend such 
examinations and inspe~tions.~~ 
Now shift to the perspective of the client who allegedly 
committed the pretrial discovery misconduct. As a practical 
matter, will that client have to call his attorney to rebut the 
testimony about the alleged misconduct? Since the client has 
firsthand knowledge of his own conduct, the client can testify 
about his action or inaction. Again, in many instances, the 
attorney will not even be present when the conduct occurs. 
A closer question would arise, though, if the client adrnit- 
ted the conduct but contended that his motivation was not any 
realization of the weakness of his position in the litigation, but 
instead good faith reliance on advice given him by his attorney. 
In this situation, would the client need to  call his attorney to 
the stand to  establish his contention? Even here the client 
could prove his contention without calling his attorney as a 
witness. The client could testify to the attorney's advice over 
any hearsay objection. Although the client is testifying about a 
sentence uttered out-of-court by the attorney, the sentence 
would be admissible as nonhearsay. If the advice took the form 
66. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED T AL., CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 
468 (1988). 
67. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 300-01 (2d ed. 
1989). 
68. IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 5, # 9:13, 9:26. 
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of an order or suggestion by the attorney, the sentence would 
be imperative in form. The hearsay rule applies only to asser- 
tive  statement^,"^ and the rule is consequently limited to 
statements which are declarative sentences or used as declara- 
tive  assertion^.^^ Moreover, even if on its face the statement 
was a declarative sentence, the client would be offering the 
testimony for a legitimate, nonhearsay purpose. The hearsay 
rule applies only when the proponent offers the out-of-court 
statement to prove the truth of the assertion contained in the 
statement.'l When an out-of-court statement is offered to 
prove only the effect on the state of mind of the hearer or read- 
er, the statement is admissible as nonhearsay-the so-called 
mental input theory of logical relevance." The mental input 
theory is applicable here; the client contends that the 
attorney's advice produced in his mind a good faith belief that 
his conduct was permissible. 
In an extreme case, the proponent of the evidence of the 
opposing client's misconduct might dispute the client's testimo- 
ny that the client's attorney had given him this advice. In this 
version of the scenario, the client might have occasion to call 
his attorney t o  the stand to corroborate his testimony. Howev- 
er, once the admissibility of evidence of the litigant's discovery 
misconduct became a well-settled proposition, there is a likeli- 
hood that it would become common practice to reduce such 
advice to writing. When the advice was in writing, the client 
could not only test* to the advice over a hearsay objection, but 
also introduce the writing to support his testimony without 
having to call his attorney as a corroborative witness. At this 
late juncture in the litigation, the client would undoubtedly be 
familiar with his attorney's handwriting style. Therefore the 
client would be a competent witness to authenticate the 
attorney's written advice.73 
Hence, even positing that the courts should exclude testi- 
mony by advocate-witnesses, the courts can embrace the propo- 
sition that evidence of an opposing client's personal pretrial 
discovery misconduct is admissible. In many instances in which 
such evidence is offered, neither its proponent nor the opposing 
69. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
70. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 42, at 569-74. 
71. FED. R. EVID. 801(~). 
72. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 42, at 578. 
73. FED. R. EVID. 901(bX2). 
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client will need to resort to advocate-witness testimony. 
have seen, the client's personal misdeeds can be highly 
tive on the question of the merit of the client's position 
809 
As we 
proba- 
in the 
litigation. Furthermore, neither the legal relevance doctrine nor 
the advocate-witness prohibition should bar the courts from 
announcing that as a general proposition, a party may offer 
evidence of the opposing client's misconduct on a consciousness- 
of-liability or guilt theory at trial. 
11. DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT BY THE OPPOSING 
CLIENT'S ATTORNEY 
Part I demonstrated that the courts should treat a client's 
own pretrial discovery misconduct as an admission by conduct 
at trial. This section turns now to  the question of whether that 
treatment should extend to discovery misconduct by the client's 
attorney. Concededly, the probative value of the attorney's 
misdeeds is not identical to that of the client's personal miscon- 
duct. Further, the considerations countervailing against admis- 
sibility differ somewhat when the miscreant is the attorney 
rather than the client. Nevertheless, on balance, like the 
client's own misdeeds, the attorney's discovery misconduct 
should be admissible at trial on the theory that it eviden-ces 
the weakness of the client's position in the litigation. 
A. The Probative Value of Evidence of   is conduct 
by the Client's Attorney 
Part 1.A discussed the logical relevance of a client's person- 
al discovery misconduct. The initial inferential step is conclud- 
ing from the conduct that the client subjectively believed that 
his position in the litigation was weak and that such belief 
presumably motivated the conduct. The final inferential step is 
a conclusion as t o  the weakness of the position; the court per- 
mits the proponent to treat the client's belief as substantive 
evidence that the client's position lacks merit. 
Superficially, the logical relevance analysis differs when 
the actor is the client's attorney. It would arguably be suspect 
to infer the client's state of mind from the attorney's conduct. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence liberalize the admissibility of 
lay opinion testi~nony,'~ but many courts continue to  exclude 
74. 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH ET AL., EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES 
IN THE STATES 8 50.3 (1987). 
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one person's opinion as to another person's state of mind.75 
These courts consider such opinions too speculative; after all, 
one person cannot "read" another person's mind. If we would 
not permit the attorney to opine directly as to the client's state 
of mind, we should reject a theory of admissibility premised on 
an inference of the client's state of mind from the attorney's 
behavior. 
However, that argument misses the point. The attorney's 
misconduct is relevant even if we draw no inference about the 
client's state of mind from the conduct. The only inference we 
need draw is the attorney's own state of mind, that is, the 
attorney's subjective belief that the client's position is weak. In 
the fmal analysis, evidence of the attorney's misconduct is not 
relevant because of an inference concerning the client's state of 
mind; it is relevant only because it leads to the ultimate, mate- 
rial inference that the client's position in the litigation is weak. 
Although the logical relevance of the attorney's misconduct 
relies on a different intermediate inference, the evidence leads 
to the same conclusion, that of the substantive weakness of the 
client's position. The theory of logical relevance simply takes a 
difTerent route to the same conclusion. 
If anything, evidence of the attorney's discovery misconduct 
may be more probative of the final inference. In some litigation, 
the case is reducible to a factual dispute, and the client has 
firsthand knowledge of the pertinent facts. In a simple tort case 
arising from a traffic accident, the defendant driver may know 
whether he ran the red light. Consequently, his knowledge of 
the merits of the case is superior to that of his attorney. How- 
ever, in many cases, the attorney's sense of the case's merit 
may be sounder than that of the client. The case may turn on 
the legal significance of the underlying facts, and the attorney 
is likely to  have a better grasp of the applicable substantive 
law. The attorney may even have a better understanding of the 
facts than the client. The alleged tortfeasor may have been an 
employee of the defendant client. The client himself may have 
no personal knowledge of the incident; and certainly by the 
time she has concluded significant discovery in the case, the 
attorney can have a superior appreciation of the factual merit 
of the client's position. In all these cases, the attorney's subjec- 
tive sense of the case's merit is a better gauge of the objective 
75. United States v. Guzzino, 810 F.2d 687, 699 n.15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1030 (1987). 
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merit of the client's position than is the client's own assess- 
ment of the case. Therefore, misconduct by the attorney may be 
an  even better gauge of the substantive merits of the client's 
case than would be misconduct by the client. 
B. Counterarguments to the Admissibility of the Discovery 
Misconduct of the Client's Attorney 
Like evidence of a client's misdeeds, testimony about the 
attorney's discovery misconduct may be excluded although it is 
logically relevant. There are a number of possible objections to 
the testimony. . 
1. The probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the 
attendant probative dangers 
At first blush, it might appear that evidence of the 
attorney's misconduct should a t  the very least be more subject 
to a Rule 403 objection than should testimony about the client's 
misconduct. However, the appearance is deceiving. If the theory 
of logical relevance treated the attorney's behavior as a basis 
for inferring the client's state of mind, the appearance would be 
accurate. On this assumption, testimony about the attorney's 
misconduct would usually be less probative; it would be safer to 
draw an  inference of the client's state of mind from the client's 
own behavior. Since testimony about the attorney's misconduct 
would have less probative value, the testimony would be more 
vulnerable to a 403 objection. 
However, as Part I1.A elaborated, the probative value of 
evidence of the attorney's misconduct does not depend on any 
inference as to the client's state of mind. Rather, the inference 
is from the attorney's behavior to the attorney's own subjective 
assessment of the strength of the client's position. That infer- 
ence is just as direct and trustworthy as the inference from the 
client's personal misconduct to the client's subjective state of 
mind. When, as is often the case, the attorney is in a better 
position to evaluate the merit of the client's position, the 
attorney's behavior is more probative of the ultimate fact in  
issue. A trial judge applying Rule 403 to evidence of the 
attorney's misdeeds should not assume that the attorney's 
behavior is less probative than the client's or that the 
attorney's behavior can be more readily excluded under Rule 
403. In each case, the judge should consider the quantum of 
probative value of the evidence on the issue of the weakness of 
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the client's litigation position. In many instances, the probative 
worth of the attorney's misconduct will be greater than that of 
the client's misconduct. In a given case, it would be perfectly 
consistent for the judge under Rule 403 to exclude evidence of 
the client's misconduct while admitting testimony about the 
attorney's misconduct. 
2. The evidence should be inadmissible against the client be- 
cause it would be unfair to impute the attorney's misconduct to 
the client 
In a sense, if the judge admits the attorney's misconduct as 
evidence against the client, the judge is holding the client vi- 
cariously responsible for the attorney's misconduct. The courts 
ordinarily impose respondeat superior liability on a master or 
principal only when the actor is a servant or agent.76 Techni- 
cally, the attorney is an independent contractor rather than an 
agent or servant of the client.77 When an employment rela- 
tionship amounts to an agency relationship, the principal has 
control over both the ends the employee pursues and the means 
the employee uses to achieve those endd8 In contrast, a rela- 
tionship constitutes an independent contract when the princi- 
pal dictates only the result to  be achieved?' The client does 
instruct the attorney as to what legal outcome the client de- 
sires. However, since the client does not tell the attorney which 
privilege arguments to invoke or discovery motions to file, the 
attorney is an independent contractor. In addition, the client 
may not have authorized or ratified the discovery misconduct 
in question. It therefore seems to  exceed the appropriate limits 
of agency law to admit evidence of the attorney's misconduct 
against the client. 
That line of argument might well be persuasive if the issue 
were the imposition of tort liability on the client for the 
attorney's conduct. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff sued 
the attorney's client for the tort of abuse of process.80 During 
an earlier lawsuit on behalf of the client, the attorney might 
have filed an otherwise proper motion for an illicit, ulterior 
76. W. PAGE KEmN El' AL., ON THE LAW OF TORTS $$ 69-71 (5th ed. 1984). 
77. WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY $ 6 (1964). 
78. Id.; Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1993). 
79. Frankel, 987 F.2d at 89; see SEAVEY, supra note 77, $ 6. 
80. KEET~N ET AL., supra note 76, $ 121. 
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purpose.81 If the evidence established that the client had nei- 
ther authorized nor ratified the attorney's conduct, the defen- 
dant client might escape liability in the subsequent abuse of 
process action. 
However, in other contexts, the client is in effect held vi- 
cariously responsible for the attorney's c0nduct.8~ Liability to 
discovery sanctions is a case in point. The attorney's miscon- 
duct can expose the client to a wide range of sanctions, includ- 
ing court orders enforceable directly against the client. For 
instance, when the judge orders issue preclusion or evidence 
preclusion as a sanction,83 the burden of the order falls upon 
the client. Sanctions law permits the judge to enter these or- 
ders against the client even when the client's attorney is the 
mi~creant.8~ A sanction is a type of penalty. In a broad sense, 
when the judge admits evidence of the attorney's misconduct 
against the client, the client is being penalized for the 
attorney's misbehavior; the admission of the evidence is simply 
81. Id. 
82. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (holding the 
client liable for the ads  of his "freely selected agentn). 
83. 2 JAMES E. HOGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY $ 15.4 (4th ed. 1988); 
8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL ~'RACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
$ 2281 (1970). 
84. It is true that under revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, it is 
ordinarily improper to impose a sanction on the client unless the client is guilty of 
personal misconduct. Slane v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 115 F.R.D. 61 
(D. Colo. 1987). See generally JOSEPH, supra note 14, $ 16(E)(1). However, as a 
general rule of sanctions law, the client may be held responsible for the attorney's 
misconduct. As the court remarked in Farm Construction Services v. Fudge, 831 
F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1987): 
With resped to appellant's claim that sanctions should have been imposed 
on counsel rather than the client, this argument would require us to 
ignore established law. In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 
626, . . . (1962), the Supreme Court expressly stated, 
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of 
petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct impos- 
es an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this 
attorney as his representative in the action and he c a ~ o t  now 
avoid the consequences of the ads  or omissions of this freely select- 
ed agent. 
370 U.S. 626, 633-34 . . . . This Circuit, following Link, has turned a 
"deaf ear" to the plea that "the sins of the attorney should not be visited 
upon the client." 
The client, of course, has the ultimate remedy of suing her attorney for malprac- 
tice. See also Leonard E .  Gross, Suppression of Evidence as a Remedy for Attorney 
Misconduct: Shall the Sins of the Attoney Be Visited upon the Client?, 54 ALB. L. 
REV. 437 (1990). 
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another kind of penalty. If an attorney's misconduct can trigger 
a sanction assessed directly against the client, the misconduct 
should be admissible against the client at trial. 
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence make it clear that 
the parameters of agency law no longer define the limits of 
admissibility. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) reads: 
A statement is not hearsay i f .  . . (2) The statement is offered 
against a party and is . . . (C) a statement by a.person autho- 
rized by the party to make a statement concerning the sub- 
ject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant con- 
cerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employ- 
ment, made within the existence of the relationship . . . .85 
Subsection (C) codifies the old, conservative view, conditioning 
the admission of an agent's statements against the principal on 
proof that the principal had authorized the agent to serve as a 
spokesper~on.~~ Under that view, the courts were reluctant to 
characterize an attorney's out-of-court statements and acts as 
admissions provable against the attorney's client? 
However, subsection (D) breaks down the traditional equa- 
tion between agency law and evidence law? Under (D), while 
the declarant must be an agent and the declaration must relate 
to  the agent's employment duties, it is no longer necessary that 
the declaration itself be authorized or ratified by the principal. 
Further, the courts have liberally interpreted the term "agent" 
in subsection (D); significantly, they have construed the term 
as encompassing attorneys,sg who are technically independent 
contractors. As a result, the vicarious admission doctrine, set 
out in subsection (D), has been extended to out-of-court state- 
ments by attorneys.g0 
85. FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
86. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 42, at 601-02. 
87. GARD, supra note 26, 4 13:34, at  488. 
88. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 42, at 602. 
89. United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 214-15 (7th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30-33 (2d Cir. 1984); Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam 
Brown Co., 792 F. Supp. 1520, 1531 (W.D. Mo. 1992) ("Generally, admissions of 
fact made by counsel are binding upon their principals so long as they are un- 
equivocal."); Kohne v. Yost, 818 P.2d 360 Wont. 1991) (binding admission made 
during closing argument); DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 459-60 (3d ed. 
1991); Gary S. Humble, Evidentiary Admissions of Defense Counsel in Federal 
Criminal Cases, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93 (1986); Biting the Hand That Feeds You: 
The Admissibility of an Attorney's Statements Against His Client in Criminal Prose- 
cutions, 1 CORP. CRIMES & INVESTIG. NEWSL., June 1993, a t  1. 
90. BINDER, supra note 89, at  459-60 (collecting cases which have extended 
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Hence, under both sanctions law and hearsay doctrine, the 
attorney's actions and statements can be imputed to the client 
although the client has not authorized the action or statement. 
Even combined with the unauthorized character of the act or 
statement, the attorney's status as an independent contractor 
does not preclude the imputation. If sanctions law and hearsay 
doctrine fix the benchmark, it is justifiable to impute the 
attorney's discovery misconduct to the client and treat the 
misconduct as an admission by the client. 
3. The admission of the attorney's misconduct against the 
client is contrary to public policy because the specter of admis- 
sion might deter counsel fron vigorously asserting her client's 
rights during pretrial discovery 
As previously stated, Professor Mansfield's position is that 
the evidential use of a party's litigation conduct should be for- 
bidden when admitting the evidence would likely deter an 
activity furthering an important objective of the judicial sys- 
In particular, he believes that the parties' pretrial in- 
vestigative activity furthers vital objectives of the judicial sys- 
terng2-facilitating pretrial evaluation of claims (and their en- 
suing settlement) and contributing to more accurate fact find- 
ing at trial.g3 He asserts that pretrial investigative activity 
should therefore be largely "~ninhibited."~~ Attaching "an evi- 
dential cost" to such activity might discourage discovery and 
make it more difficult for the judicial system to  promote pretri- 
al settlement and accurate fact findingOg5 
Professor Mansfield's argument lends some support to  the 
contention that treating the attorney's discovery misconduct as 
an admission by the client would contravene public policy. The 
experience with sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Proce- 
dure 11 is also supportive. It has been suggested that the stan- 
dards for imposing sanctions under Rule 11 are so vague that 
the mere prospect of sanctions is having a chilling effect on 
vigorous advocacy by litigat~rs.'~ Even the drafters of Rule 11 
the vicarious admission doctrine in this way). 
91. Mansfield, supra note 25, at 701-02. 
92. Id. at 727. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 728 n.90. 
96. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule I l -Some  
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 
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acknowledge that if enforced unpredictably, the rule may "chill 
an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or 
legal the~ries."~' With some anecdotal evidence:' one com- 
mentator asserts that "[tlhe lawyer who hears the footsteps of 
sanctions may be less willing to pursue an aggressive course or 
to advance a novel . . . theory?' 
Albeit plausible, this argument is unconvincing. It is true 
that in the main, attorneys should be encouraged to conduct a 
thorough pretrial investigation of their clients' position; and the 
policy of encouraging pretrial investigation may warrant the 
recognition of a general exclusionary rule barring evidential 
use of investigative activity. However, the focus of this article 
is on discovery misconduct. As Professor Mansfield himself has 
stated, "There should be an exception, it is suggested, because 
if there was misconduct, the case falls outside the exclusionary 
policy. There is no reason to protect and encourage miscon- 
duct."'" Discovery misconduct in the precise form of obstruc- 
tionism has become such a substantial problem that the judi- 
ciary should be taking steps to deter it.''' The case for ex- 
cluding evidence of discovery misconduct overstates the risk of 
chilling legitimate attorney behavior and overlooks the policy 
considerations favoring the admission of such evidence. 
It is debatable whether Rule 11 is having the claimed chill- 
ing effect.lo2 However, even assuming the truth of that claim, 
it does not follow that treating an attorney's obstructionism as 
an admission by the client would have a similar impact. Rule 
11 supposedly generates a chilling effect because its substan- 
tive standards are ambiguous and its application is consequent- 
ly ~npredictable.'~~ The text of Rule 11 undeniably contains 
GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986). 
97. FED. R. CN. P. 11 advisory comm. note (1983). 
98. Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 
123 F.R.D. 361 (1988); Russ M. Herman, Rule 11 Is Prejudicial to Plaintiffs, NAT'L 
L.J., July 24, 1989, at  17; Martha Middleton, Creative Advocates Scared W, NAT'L 
L.J., Apr. 24, 1989, at  3 (citing a Third Circuit study); Jerold S. Solovy et al., 
Sanctions Under Fedeml Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 33 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 354 
(1989). But see THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 8-10, 
157-68 (1988) (a Federal Judicial Center study finding little evidence of a chilling 
impact). 
99. Daniel S. Hinerfeld, The Sanctions Explosion, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1987, at 
33. 
100. Letter from John H. Mansfield to Edward J. Imwinkelried (Feb. 23, 1993). 
101. See'supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
102. See WILLGING, supm note 98, at 8-10, 157-68 (Federal Judicial Center 
study disputing the claim). 
103. Middleton, supra note 98, at  3; Note, PZausible Pleadings: Developing 
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broad, rather vague language. For example, under Rule 11, a n  
attorney's filing is sanctionable if the filing is "interposed for 
any improper purpose."lM It  is understandable that language 
so indefinite and expansive might give a practicing attorney 
pause. 
However, the admission-by-conduct theory relates to a 
narrower, more readily identifiable category of behavior. To 
trigger the theory, the proponent of the evidence a t  trial must 
do more than point to an unethical act by the opposing attor- 
ney. To begin with, the act must be intentional. Moreover, the 
act must be in the nature of the suppression of evidencelo5 or 
the obstruction of access to evidence. Unless the act falls into 
this category of conduct, as a matter of logic the a d  will not 
give rise to the inference of consciousness of liability or guilt. 
Including a frivolous count in a complaint might subject the 
plaintiff's attorney to a Rule 11 sanction;lo6 but standing 
alone, that conduct would not sustain a permissive inference 
that the plaintiffs attorney was attempting to block the 
defense's access to any evidence. Rule 11 has an exceptionally 
broad sweep, but the admission theory would apply to a much 
more limited category of attorney behavior. 
Not only is it an exaggeration to claim that the application 
of the admission theory to attorney misconduct will chill com- 
petent representation during pretrial discovery; the claim also 
overlooks policy considerations that more than counterbalance 
any potential chill. The threat of discipline imposed by the bar 
has been largely ineffective to deter discovery misconduct.107 
In many jurisdictions, the slow pace of bar disciplinary proceed- 
ings'" robs the threat of much of its credibility. Likewise, the 
prospect of sanctions imposed by the judge has not curbed 
discovery misconduct. For that matter, embroiling the innocent 
party in time-consuming, satellite litigation over sanctions may 
work to the advantage of the guilty party--especially in  "fast 
trackn j~risdictions. '~~ 
However, treating the attorney's misconduct as the client's 
admission may strike the right pressure point: the client. The 
Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987). 
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
105. GARD, supm note 26, 8 13:46, at 517. 
106. Note, supra note 103, at 634-44. 
107. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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client pays the attorney's fee, and hence the client is in a better 
position than either the bar or the judge to effectively bring the 
attorney's discovery misconduct to a halt. Once the client real- 
izes that such misconduct may be provable against him at trial, 
the client will have good reason to instruct the attorney to  
eschew obstructionism. If the person who pays the bill gives 
the attorney that instruction, the attorney is likely to take the 
instruction seriously. If there is a need to deter discovery mis- 
conduct, the legal system should apply the deterrent pressure 
where it will do the most good. The attorney might not be in 
awe of the authority of either the bar or the judge, but the 
attorney is likely to heed the client who wields the power of the 
purse. 
4. The evidence should be excluded on the ground that the ad- 
mission of such evidence will pressure the client's attorney to 
testify in violation of the advocate-witness prohibition 
As in the case of the client's personal discovery misconduct, 
the final counterargument rests on the advocate-witness prohi- 
bition. However, in this context, the counterargument is stron- 
ger.. 
As in the case of the client's own misconduct, there will be 
times when the counterargument fails merely because there is 
little or no need for testimony by an attorney in violation of the 
prohibition. If the only issue is whether the attorney committed 
the act in question, there may be better evidence than the 
attorney's testimony. There might be third party witnesses to  
the act who are less biased than the attorneys, or by happen- 
stance, an impartial court official or a disinterested layperson 
may have been present. Or the act might be documented and 
described in detail by the transcript of the deposition hearing 
where the misconduct allegedly occurred. Even when the pivot- 
al issue is why the attorney committed the act in question, 
there might be better evidence than the attorney's own trial 
testimony. By the time of trial when the attorney realizes the 
contemplated evidential use of her conduct, her bias would 
probably have the greatest impact on her testimony. In con- 
trast, if at the time of the act she stated her intent or motiva- 
tion, not only would the statement arguably be admissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),'1° the reliability of 
110. Rule 803 authorizes the admission of a statement of a declarant's "then 
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the pretrial statement would also be less suspect than the 
attorney's trial testimony. Thus, in some cases, it may be possi- 
ble to  present evidence of the attorney's discovery misconduct 
at trial without necessitating testimony by the attorneys on 
either side. 
Realistically, though, such cases will be rare. In the more 
typical case, one or both of the clients may have a bona fide 
need to call their attorney to the stand to testify about the 
alleged discovery misconduct. The only persons present may 
have been the two attorneys, and the issue of the occurrence of 
the act may be a swearing contest between the attorneys. Even 
when it is uncontroverted that the act occurred, there may be a 
serious question about the motivation for the act; at the time of 
the ad ,  the attorney may not have made a contemporaneous 
avowal of her intent. In these cases, if the judge admits evi- 
dence of the attorney's discovery misconduct, the evidence will 
almost inevitably inject the issue of the attorney's credibility 
into the case. The courts have tended to apply the advocate- 
witness prohibition when the introduction of such evidence will 
have that effect? 
Part I of this article demonstrated that when the proffered 
evidence describes the client's own misconduct, the proponent 
can frequently moot the question of the advocate-witness prohi- 
bition by demonstrating that there is no necessity for attorney 
testimony. In that context, the prohibition does not preclude 
the adoption of a general rule admitting evidence of the client's 
misconduct even if we accept the prohibition at face value. 
However, in most cases in which the evidence relates to  mis- 
conduct by the client's attorney, the proponent will be unable to 
moot the issue of the application of the prohibition. When the 
focus is squarely on the attorney's behavior, the introduction of 
the evidence may prompt one or both of the parties to  resort to  
attorney testimony. For that reason, we must confront the 
policy question of whether the prohibition mandates a general 
rule excluding evidence of the attorney's misconduct. That 
question should be answered in the negative. 
To begin with, an affirmative answer would represent 
Catch 22 reasoning. The advocate-witness prohibition is a rule 
existing state of mind" when the state of mind is relevant under Rule 401. In this 
variation of the problem, the focus is on the attorney's state of mind. 
111. United States v. Melo, 702 F. Supp; 939 (D. Mass. 1988); People v. 
Paperno, 429 N.E.2d 797 (N.Y. 1981). 
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of legal ethics rather than evidence.l12 An affirmative answer 
entails invoking that rule af legal ethics to shield at trial evi- 
dence of the attorney's discovery misconduct. However, that 
misconduct is likely to amount to  a violation of other rules of 
legal ethics.l13 A.B.A. Model Rule 3.4(a) forbids an attorney 
from "unlawfully obstruct[ing] another party's access to evi- 
dence or unlawfidly alter[ing], destroy[ing] or conceal[ing] a 
document or other material having potential evidentiary val- 
ue."'l4 After listing these forbidden acts, the same rule pro- 
hibits an attorney from "counsel[ing] or assist[ing] another 
person to  do any such act."ll5 Rule 3.4(d) makes it a disciplin- 
ary offense to "fail to  make reasonably diligent effort to comply 
with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing par- 
t ~ . " " ~  Rule 3.40 adds that an attorney may not "request a 
person other than a client to  refrain from voluntarily giving 
relevant information to  another party.""' All of these acts are 
classic examples of admissions by conduct, and all of these acts 
are direct violations of the legal ethical standards prescribed by 
the Model Rules. It is wrong-minded to  allow the opposing 
client to cite one rule of legal ethics to  exclude evidence of con- 
duct which is independently violative of other rules of legal 
ethics. Permitting the opposition to  do so compounds the viola- 
tion. 
Furthermore, it is of dubious wisdom to  use the mecha- 
nism of an evidentiary exclusionary rule to enforce this rule of 
legal ethics. Professor Mansfield has written that none of the 
rationales advanced for the advocate-witness prohibition is 
"entirely ~atisfactory.""~ Other respected commentators have 
voiced doubts about the advisability of the rule.llg Whatever 
may be the merit of the prohibition as a doctrine of legal ethics, 
the case for using an evidentiary exclusionary rule to  enforce 
the doctrine is unconvincing. The very evolution of the legal 
112. UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 46, ch. 4. 
113. Id. ch. 6. 
114. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1983). 
115. Id. Rule 3 . a ) .  
116. Id. Rule 3.4(d). 
117. Id. Rule 3.4(f). 
118. Mansfield, supra note 25, at 704. 
119. Arnold N. Enker, The Rationale of the Rule That Forbicls a Lawyer to Be 
an Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455; Rich- 
ard C. Wydick, Dial Counsel as Witness: The Code. and the Model Rules, 15 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 651, 659 (1982). 
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ethics doctrine suggests a growing understanding that it is 
unjustifiable to use an evidentiary enforcement mechanism. 
The starting point in the evolution of the doctrine was the 
extreme version of the rule vicariously disqualifying the other 
members of the advocate-witness' firm as well as personally 
disqualifying the advocate-witness. That was the version set 
out in the American Bar Association's former Code of Profes- 
sional Re~ponsibi1ity.l~~ Concededly, when the same attorney 
testifies and presents the closing argument, there may be a 
risk that the jury will confuse the facts testified to  and the 
inferences argued during summation. The risk of jury confusion 
is a probative danger which the judge may factor into her Rule 
403 analysis.l2l However, the  commentator^'^ noted that 
risk is absent when another attorney from the firm serves as 
trial advocate; one attorney testifies, but a different attorney 
delivers the opening statement and closing argument.lB The 
exclusion of the attorney-witness' testimony is indefensible; 
there is no more risk of confusion than there would be when 
the trial advocate calls any other witness to the stand. 
In part due to such criticism, the doctrine evolved into a 
more limited rule which merely personally disqualified the trial 
advocate. Under this version of the rule, an attorney-witness 
may testify if another member of the firm tries the case, but an 
attorney-witness may not testify at a hearing she herself is 
trying. This is the narrower, modified version of the doctrine 
set out in the new Rules of Professional Conduct.lM Although 
the modification of the doctrine is more defensible than the 
earlier version, even the modification has not escaped criticism. 
In defense of the modified doctrine, it is sometimes argued that 
the opposition is "handicapped in challenging the credibility of 
the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the 
120. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 (1969). 
121. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
122. Harold A. Brown & Louis M. Brown, Disqualification of the Testifying 
Advocate-A Firm Rule?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 597, 609-11 (1979); see also, UNDERWOOD 
& FORTUNE, supra note 46, 5 4.8, at  162; Jeffrey A. Stonerock, The Advocate-Wit- 
ness Rule: Anachronism or Necessary Restraint?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 821 (1990) (advo- 
cating abolition of the rule and suggesting that the rule's purpose could be better 
served by simply applying Federal Rule of Evidence 403 under the court's supervi- 
sory power). 
123. UNDERWOOD & F O ~ N E ,  supm note 46, § 4.2, a t  142 ("little chance that 
the line between fact and argument will be blurred"); Brown & Brown, supra note 
122, at 609-11 (1979). 
124. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL C O N D U ~  Rule 3.7 (1983). 
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case."125 However, that argument is spurious. Perhaps the 
most potent impeachment technique is proof of the witness's 
bias.lz6 Even before any cross-examination of the attorney- 
witness, it becomes evident to the jury that the attorney- 
witness's credibility is impeachable for bias. The jury has seen 
the lawyer serve as the client's attorney during the earlier 
stages of the trial, and that same lawyer now takes the stand 
as a witness. The inference of the advocate-witness's bias is 
obvious, strong, and undeniable. 
Can the modified doctrine be defended on the alternative 
ground that there is a risk of jury confusion? The risk is cer- 
tainly greater than it would be in a case where one firm mem- 
ber serves as trial attorney but another fun member testifies. 
In  that case, there is little risk that the jury will confuse the 
facts testified to by one attorney and the inferences argued by 
the other. Here the same attorney testifies to  facts and later 
argues inferences. Yet even in this situation, the risk of confu- 
sion is inadequate justification for excluding the attorney's 
testimony. 
In many published opinions, the courts have upheld the 
admission of a witness's direct testimony in which the witness 
testified to both facts and opinionated inferences from the 
facts.12? For example, the cases are legion permitting experi- 
enced police officers to  both factually describe an accused's 
conduct and opine that the conduct matches the modus operan- 
di for a particular  rime.'^ In these opinions, the courts have 
made short shrift of the contention that the testimony presents 
an intolerable risk that the jury will mistake inference for 
fact? However, the potential risk of confusion in the above 
situations dwarfs the potential risk presented when an attor- 
125. 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 252 (rev. ed. 1985) (quoting CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9). 
126. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVI- 
DENCE § 9-7, at 240 (2d ed. 1992) ("Bias impeachment is one of the best weight 
attacks, since the jurors can easily understand the attack."). The Supreme Court 
has accorded special constitutional status to the right to impeach a witness for 
bias. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED'S CONSTJTU- 
TIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE 8 8-7b (1990). 
127. United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Thomas, 896 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Phylis S. Bamberger, The Dangerous Ex- 
pert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 855, 856-57 (1986). 
128. Edward J. Imwinkelried & Ephraim Margolin, The Case for the Admissi- 
bility of Defense Testimony About Customary Political Practices in Wu:ial Corrup- 
tion Prosecutions, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1991). 
129. See id. for a collection of cases. 
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ney argues inferences hours, days, or weeks after testifying to 
facts. The time gap between the testimony and the argument 
reduces the risk to a level far below the danger of confusion 
present in the opinions which discuss other types of witnesses. 
If the danger of confusion does not warrant the exclusion of the 
testimony in those opinions, a fortiori the risk does not justify 
evidentiary enforcement of the advocate-witness prohibition. 
A new ethical rule, adopted by the California bar, reflects a 
further step in the evolution of the advocate-witness doctrine. 
Under Rule 5-210, which took effect in 1989, the client's attor- 
ney may testify over the opposing party's objection. The only 
requisite is "the informed, written consent of the client."130 
The implicit assumption of Rule 5-210 is that the opposing 
party should not have the benefit of an evidentiary 
exclusionary rule to block testimony by the client's attorney. If 
the proponent of the opposing attorney's discovery misconduct 
desires to call his attorney to prove the alleged misconduct, the 
proponent may. Similarly, the opposing client may call his 
attorney to rebut the allegation. 
Even in the jurisdictions which have not yet followed the 
lead of the California bar, there are indications of growing 
judicial dissatisfaction with the advocate-witness prohibition. 
Many courts have rejected disqualification motions based on 
the prohibition for the stated reason that testimony by the 
attorney would be cu~nulative.'~' Some c ~ u r t s  have gone to 
the length of ruling that even when there might otherwise be a 
genuine need for the attorney's testimony about a certain fact, 
an offer by the attorney's client to stipulate to that fact elimi- 
nates the need. 132 
It would be dishonest to overstate either the extent of the 
liberalization of the advocate-witness prohibition or the likeli- 
hood that courts will admit testimony violative of the prohibi- 
tion. Most jurisdictions remain committed to either the origi- 
nal, broad prohibition or the modified version of the doctrine. 
There is a large body of modern case law recognizing the advo- 
130. RULES OF ~ O F E S S I O N A L  CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 
5-210(C) (1989). 
131. Banque Arabe et Int'l D'Inv. v. Ameritrust Corp., 690 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. 
Ohio 1988); Clinton Mills, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 226 
(D.S.C. 1988); Gaul1 v. Wyeth Lab., 687 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Brotherhood 
Ry. Carmen v. Delpro Co., 549 F. Supp. 780, 788 (D. Del. 1982). 
132. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1986); Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v. United Health Clubs, 505 P. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
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cate-witness prohibition.ls3 To borrow a phrase once applied 
to a much-maligned contract doctrine, the  courts have often en- 
forced the prohibition "with a rigor worthy of a better 
c a ~ s e . " ' ~  The upshot is that many jurisdictions will undoubt- 
edly continue to employ an evidentiary exclusionary rule to bar 
testimony by either attorney trying the case. If the proponent 
proffers testimony about the opposing attorney's discovery 
misconduct, judges in these jurisdictions will be inclined to fmd 
the testimony objectionable. 
This article has advanced the thesis that a t  trial, a litigant 
should be permitted to treat the opposition's pretrial discovery 
obstructionism as an admission by conduct of the weakness of 
the opposition's position in the litigation. In the foreseeable 
future, the thesis is likely to make only limited inroads with 
the courts. As Part I1 pointed out, the jurisdictions which are 
still committed to the advocate-witness prohibition may balk at 
admitting testimony about the attorney's discovery misconduct. 
Part I presents the less controversial argument for applying the 
admission theory to the client's personal discovery misconduct, 
but even that argument may strike some courts as too avant- 
garde; the courts are likely to admit evidence of client miscon- 
duct only when there is "the clearest proof."'35 
Although this article presents a novel theory, it is one 
worth pressing. The admission-by-conduct theory is a well- 
settled one; and discovery obstructionism by either the client or 
the client's attorney is probative on that theory. Moreover, the 
theory is a promising deterrent to discovery misconduct against 
which neither bar discipline nor judicial sanction has proved to 
be an effective disincentive. The admission-by-conduct theory is 
promising precisely because it can make the client pay in a 
meaningful sense for discovery misconduct. Once the client 
comes to that realization, the client may desist from miscon- 
duct. More importantly, the client may tell the attorney that 
133. David B. Harrison, Annotation, Disqualif~ation of Attorney Because Mem- 
ber of His Firm Is or Ought to Be Witness in Case-Modern Cases, 5 A.L.R.4th 574 
(1981). 
134. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS Q 2- 
21(a), at 102 (3d ed. 1987) (commenting on the common law rule that to form a 
contract, the terms of an acceptance must be an absolutely perfect "mirror-image" 
of the terms of the offer). 
135. GARD, supra note 26, 8 13:34, at 485. 
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the attorney is to refrain from discovery misconduct. Even a n  
attorney who has little regard for the bar or judiciary may 
listen closely to the client who controls the purse strings. 
Sadly, in the past the minority of attorneys bent on h s -  
trating the discovery system have been more creative than the 
majority of attorneys who litigate in good faith. The former 
have whole "bags N 1  of tricks," including obstructionist tac- 
tics.ls6 It is time that the latter match the creativity of the 
former. An imaginative, offensive strategy against discovery 
misconduct is long overdue.13' The admission-by-conduct the- 
ory may be that strategy. 
136. Peter Gruenberger, Discovery Abusers Have Many Bags Full of Tricks, LE- 
GAL TIMES, July 4, 1983, at 18. 
137. UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 46, 8 5.9, at 204 ("Counsel should be 
alert to opportunities to turn the consequences of an opponent's misconduct back 
upon- him or her."). 
